

# *Participatory Incremental Upgrading:*

*A pilot study of a Planact project in a Johannesburg  
inner city 'bad building'*



BUQS7008: Management of Existing Housing Stock

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## Introduction

Estimates of the number of ‘bad buildings’ in the inner city of Johannesburg alone range from 130 (Erasmus, 2012) to 235 (Royston et al, 2007).<sup>1</sup> The City Council has responded with various initiatives, such as the Inner City Property Scheme: transferring these buildings to the private sector, which would then have the responsibility to ensure that they ‘become viable and productive economic assets’ (Joburg News, 2011). Large property developers such as City Prop and Afcho have also taken initiative to refurbish buildings into decent accommodation for rent on the ‘formal’ market. However, due to administrative problems and laws preventing unlawful evictions, many of these schemes fail or are stalled for years.<sup>2</sup> The problem is that many of these so-called ‘bad buildings’ provide the only accommodation affordable to poor people that need a place in the city.<sup>3</sup> The most affordable accommodation provided in the ‘formal’ sector, such as in Joshco’s subsidised communal rooms, is around R700 excluding services (Joshco, 2011). According to the Socioeconomic Rights Institute, this rental is still higher than ‘low income’ tenants can afford (Tissington, 2012), and the supply is very limited, resulting in a long waiting list (Lund, 2011). Effectively, through both City-assisted and market processes, the inner city *is* providing more decent accommodation possibilities, but at the same time, this process has the potential to force the poor out (Charlton, 2012).

With Planact’s offices being located in Braamfontein, Johannesburg, we clearly recognised the management crisis in inner city housing stock, and with one of Planact’s main focus areas being integrated human settlements, it seemed something we should explore. But our experience is in informal settlements: we were unsure as to whether we could be useful in the inner city, and if so, the best approach to take. We could not find any literature or even basic documentation to assist, and turned to more experienced partners for guidance. This paper reports on what followed, where Planact initiated a participatory incremental upgrading pilot project in a specific ‘bad building’. The paper provides various reflections on the approach taken, before considering a possible way forward for managing ‘bad buildings’, and the organisation’s role in the inner city. As it is the first time a project like this has gone ahead, at least in Johannesburg, it is largely a practical account, with references to literature where possible.

## Determining Planact’s Use-Value and Role in Johannesburg’s Inner City

As a first step Planact approached the Inner City Resources Centre (ICRC), which shared the same funder and had a number of years experience working in the inner city. After a preliminary meeting, it was decided we would visit different buildings where the ICRC had been supporting residents<sup>4</sup> with paralegal advice. We met with the residents committees to find out what their biggest concerns were, and how Planact could best assist. Residents in all

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<sup>1</sup> Zack et al (2009) provide a comprehensive definition of ‘bad buildings’ in their strategy. An excerpt from this is “‘Bad buildings’ are buildings which were once sound in physical structure, management, use and occupancy, but have become dysfunctional in one or more ways’.

<sup>2</sup> Private companies are beginning to turn to other means to secure buildings, such as paying residents to leave (Makulubane, 2012).

<sup>3</sup> Many people earn such a meagre income that even if they were to secure a place in an informal settlement they would not be able to afford the transport costs into the city centre for work (Bertoldi, 2009).

<sup>4</sup>The applicability of the term ‘residents’ vs. ‘occupants’ to this case study could be debated. ‘Occupants’ is probably more suitable in an academic sense, considering that the people dwelling in the building do not pay rent to the person possessing the title deed, and there is high turnover. However, within the project and in conversation with those living in the building, ‘residents’ was always used, and it is thus used for this paper.

four buildings were very clear that the key problem was the terrible living conditions. Milton Court was in by far the worst condition: it had no running water, no electricity, no working toilets, mud- and excrement-caked corridors and a build up of rubbish (from old mattresses to rotten food to sewerage) up to the first floor on either side of the building. Even before we could begin going through the 'assessment questions' we had drawn up, the residents present in the meeting pleaded with us to help by at least providing a skip for them to be able to clear the rubbish themselves.



**Figure 1:** Milton Court was in by far the worst condition of the buildings we visited.

As part of this 'role assessment phase' Planact also arranged meetings with the City of Joburg to find out the current status of the Inner City Charter (see CoJ, 2007), discuss Planact's ideas on our role and partners in the inner city, and find out where the City best saw us fitting in.<sup>5</sup> Although the City spoke of various plans for their own pilot projects and programmes which would align well with our plans, over the next weeks nothing solid materialised.

Planact continued meeting with other potential partners who could complement an intervention into a specific building, and from whom we could learn. A flexible partnership was formed with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Khanya-African Institute for Democracy Driven Development (Khanya), in addition to the relationship already in place with ICRC. Planact envisioned that the broader strategy would utilise our complementary competencies.

### Policy, practice, and Planact's strategy

Deciding on the best approach was in some ways intuitive, due to Planact and the other partners' prior experiences in other contexts. However, some Planact staff members expressed caution, considering our lack of experience in the inner city. After searching through the literature, as well as other NGO and government reports, we were unable to find any documentation of dealing with buildings such as these, aside from the MSF's own experience in other inner city buildings (see MSF, 2011). In discussions with the MSF they often referred to inner city slum buildings as 'vertical informal settlements'. Planact has extensive experience with strengthening participation in informal settlement upgrading (see Planact, 2011), and we considered applying these approaches in this pilot project.

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<sup>5</sup> Initially, Planact continued engaging in the revision of the Inner City Charter, with the idea that our work could contribute to this key document, and the City continued to commend our motivation and work. However, over the months, the City's process switched to an internal one, where NGOs and the public were no longer invited.

Literature consulted on participatory (incremental) upgrading included that on UN-Habitat's programs (UN-Habitat, 2009), World Bank-initiated projects (Werlin, 1999), and evaluations of slum-upgrading processes in Brazil (Magalhães & Di Villarosa, 2012). Most build on the ideas of Turner, and it is his original work that proved particularly useful to us. Turner argued that the solution to slums is not to demolish the housing but to improve the environment – get rid of unsanitary human waste, polluted water and filth (van der Linden, 1986). He argued that squatters 'squatters' often showed great organisational skill ... and ... could be trusted to maintain the infrastructure that was provided' (Werlin, 1999: 1523). His theories also suggest that, as the environment improves, 'most slum residents will better their homes and living conditions' (Werlin, 1999: 1524), especially when encouraged by security of tenure and access to credit. Although Turner saw these as government's responsibilities, many early slum-upgrading projects were shown to fail within a few years, as residents did not have the knowledge or will to maintain the facilities (Magalhães & Di Villarosa, 2012). More recent authors stress the need for a strengthening of participatory governance, and democratic management structures. With Planact's experience in capacity building of steering committees and other structures in informal settlements, it is here that we saw Planact's strengths lying.

Furthermore, there are extensive accounts of setting up cooperatives and share blocks, with local studies commissioned by organisations such as the Social Housing Foundation (see for example, SHF, 2000). However, Milton Court was in such a dire situation, with almost non-existent management, etc., that setting up a cooperative or similar management structure would not be an option, at least not in the short term.


The City acknowledges the need for alternative approaches in dealing with the dual conundrum of 'bad buildings' and lack of decent affordable accommodation in Johannesburg and the inner city, and in the last fifteen years has commissioned a range of different policy and strategy documents, such as the 'Bad Buildings Programme', which then became the 'Better Buildings Programme' and then the 'City Property Programme' (Fraser, 2010). However, with the name changes, and several departmental relocations, Region F housing department, under which the inner city area falls, is still lacking any clear strategy, and no real success in implementation or on-going management (Zack, 2012, pers. comm.). Even in the 'Bad Buildings Programme' document, buildings such as Milton Court do not fall into any of the 'typologies of 'bad buildings' and strategic requirements'. It is not a place where 'slumlording' is present (Zack et al, 2009: 38), nor 'small-scale landlords' (39), and neither is it a 'public sector owned building' (41).

Without directly applicable good-practice documents or policy to fall back on, we decided to emphasise the *incremental* approach to the upgrading process, with the strategy for the next step being defined by the outcome of the last. As per our step-by-step approach, as long as the clean up and upgrading process was continuing with some success, improving the direct environment of residents, we would motivate and support where necessary. In general, we modelled the project on a 'quick win/ long term support' strategy: a resident-driven clean-up and preliminary upgrading or provision of emergency services, combined with a much longer term strengthening of management structures. As initiator of the project, Planact took on the role of coordinator. It was envisioned by Planact that due to MSF's substantially larger budget, they would be able to provide the tools and materials for the clean up, as well as financing the basic upgrading. Khanya would look at the sustainable livelihoods aspects. ICRC would share with the partners their knowledge of the internal workings of the building and act as initial liaison with the residents, as well as assisting in any

legal matters. Planact would work with initiating and strengthening management structures within the building, with the view of making any advances in cleaning and upgrading sustainable in the longer term. As initiator of the project, Planact acted as coordinator.

## Overview of the building

Milton Court<sup>6</sup> has been without clear City Council management or an active private owner for roughly 20 years. Its previous owner absconded from the building in the early 90s. In 2008 the building was bought by a property magnate with a large portfolio in the inner city, Mark Steele. However, after an initial interest in ‘clearing out’ the building, which was thwarted by residents (assisted by the ICRC), he left the residents to their own devices for the next four years. It was unclear as to Steele’s longer term plans, and the tenants continued to self-manage the building relatively well given the circumstances until 2010 when the residents of two adjacent buildings were evicted, and sought places to stay in Milton Court. Most of the new tenants were undocumented migrants from Tanzania. The building became overcrowded, while simultaneously experiencing a deterioration in management systems (see below). At around the same time, the water supply was cut, resulting in a severe degradation of the living environment.



**Figure 2:** In 2010 the building experienced a serious deterioration in the living environment. Here, drains remain blocked even after all waste is removed in the pilot project.

## Project initiated, with Planact’s focus on strengthening management

We held the first ‘project scoping’ and planning meetings with the Milton Court ‘residents committee’<sup>7</sup> and broader resident body in May 2012, as part of the inception and planning stages (see flow chart, Figure 3). The implementation stage began with the delivery of tools and the first skip occurred at the start of July (PMI, 2000). The work continued slowly but surely, until the five men doing the cleaning<sup>8</sup> had filled sixteen skips, each twelve metres long, full of waste from the roof and sides of the building. Trying to motivate residents to push for further improvements, Planact brought on board journalists from different papers to cover the story (see Smith, 2012). Over the period of July to September, those residents driving the campaign managed to collect money to install a security gate, with our support employ a plumber to unblock the most important drains, and install two standpipes. We

<sup>6</sup> Due to on-going litigation, this information is extremely confidential. If this report is to be distributed in any way, it is essential that the author is consulted, so that necessary precautions can be taken.

<sup>7</sup> See below, for an explanation as to the use of inverted commas here.

<sup>8</sup> Against our advice, it came about that only five men did all the cleaning, paid by other residents. Unbeknown to us, it was not even the broader resident body that was paying these men (see below).




Figure 3: Flow chart showing steps and stages in project.

liaised with the Socioeconomic Rights Institute to litigate for the water to be reconnected.<sup>9</sup> By mid-September the building was reconnected to the mains. At surface level, the campaign could have been seen to be a relative success, however, it is uncertain whether management structures changed for the better as a result of our intervention, and the long-term sustainability of the project is definitely debatable.



**Figure 4:** The five men doing the cleaning filled sixteen skips with waste from the building.

One of Planact's main concerns was the sustainability of the project and the shifts in power and management that would result from the combined intervention, with the possibility of perverse outcomes (see Green, 2000). Even during the campaign, problems continued of social deviance and general behaviour destructive to the clean up effort. Nevertheless, we saw the clean up and upgrading as being a way both to test and build better management in the building. We hoped that residents were unmotivated only because they had not seen progress in their living conditions for a number of years (see Magalhães & Di Villasora, 2012).

When we started work at Milton Court, the 'committee' whom with we met in initial 'project scoping' meetings was a loose collection of people without any structure or permanent engagement. The actual committee, elected many years ago, consisted mostly of female domestic workers, who were not present during the day. In addition, they were of the 'previous generation', before the wave of new residents arrived from the neighbouring buildings, and did not have any real connection with or authority over the current melee, many of whom were younger men. Although there were three Tanzanian men who had been co-opted onto the committee by the ICRC, they were far from active.

We realised at the first mass meeting just how little respect this residents committee had, and how greatly the building was malfunctioning as a result. The women declared they wished to take leave of their responsibilities, as no one listened to them. However, when the ICRC attempted a re-election at the meeting, it erupted into chaos. Realising that this was an essential process to securing a better-managed building in the longer term, Planact proposed that we treat the election of the committee as part of a longer process, centred around the cleaning as a 'test' to see who was keen to take the lead.

<sup>9</sup> This process was started by the ICRC before Planact's involvement, as per s73 of the Municipal Systems Act, and s27(1)(b) of the Constitution: everyone has the right to a minimum basic water supply.

The cleaning campaign did indeed serve to highlight people who were more dedicated to ensuring a liveable environment. Over the period of the campaign, from mid-July to the end of August, an informal cleaning committee formed, made up of the five men doing the cleaning, as well as those residents playing a more vocal or organisational role. Two men became most prominent a non-executive 'chief' (the chair of the old committee) and a 'caretaker'. The 'chief' took on this role mainly because he was the longest-standing resident in the building, having lived there since 1979. The 'caretaker' was recognised as such simply because he was the most motivated resident, probably due to the reliance on the accommodation for his job and his children. As the cleaning campaign drew to a close thus indicating the closing out of the 'quick win' stage, Planact felt after discussions with these two men that it was time to move onto the next stage of the strategy, and work toward a more formal management structure being put in place.



**Figure 5:** The cleaning campaign did serve to highlight people who were more motivated, such as the three residents (right) standing with Planact project officer (left) and ICRC staff member (second from right).

We assumed the role of an independent electoral body, and held an open-ballot election at the end of August.<sup>10</sup> Many of those men who were more prominent during the cleaning campaign were nominated, and five men elected, each with a significantly higher number of votes than the other candidates. According to the simple democratic principle that the most votes wins, all seemed to be in order for effective representation of the resident body.

The committee being elected, Planact proceeded immediately with capacity building. We organised a full day workshop at the beginning of September, and through ICRC invited committee members from other similar buildings, to share experiences and collaborate. Although the workshop covered a lot of ground, we were disturbed at the lack of basic abilities of the Milton Court committee members. Three of the committee struggled to read and could not fill in a simple questionnaire. Nevertheless, we arranged for a follow-up strategy-planning meeting in mid-September to deal with the more immediate upgrading concerns – clearing the drains and completing the process of connecting the internal water supply. However, over the two-week period from the election until the strategy-planning meeting, it was clear from the smaller meetings held that the commitment was waning even within the new committee. The only two residents taking responsibility remained the 'caretaker' and the 'chief', with the most strain being placed on the 'caretaker' for everyday management. He was beginning to suffer in terms of health, and was also struggling to find time away from his commitments in the building to earn enough money.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Documents such as Un-Habitat (2009) suggest a 'show-of-hands' or open-ballot election for various reasons.

<sup>11</sup> The 'caretaker' earned an income by selling RICA'd simcards on the street as an informal agent for MTN.



The next step in strengthening management structures was to have each room nominate a 'leader'. We hoped this would achieve a more representative decision-making structure, as well as provide greater support to the 'caretaker' in his efforts to cut down on social deviance in the building. Furthermore, we wished to utilise the room representatives in a planned enumeration process carried out by residents, where we could then jointly map who the more 'permanent' residents in the building were, and their basic demographics. This would allow for better strategic planning. We also saw it as a way that the committee's treasurer could ensure that residents able to contribute to the cleaning, security and upgrading were doing so.

Over the course of our work in the building, Planact began to find out about more and more problematic aspects, particularly to do with the management structures we were supporting (see following section). It reached a point where we would have almost definitely called the project off. However, the final decision on whether to pull out was rendered unnecessary: after four years of leaving residents to their own means, the owner Mark Steele started a concerted evictions process. After discussions with the elected residents committee, we handed over project coordination to ICRC, which has extensive experience in evictions cases. The Planact project officer who had been heading the project had informed residents a number of weeks previously that he was leaving the organisation (and a colleague would take over the Milton Court project), so this was a smooth process.

### Existing management structures and the relationship to drug trafficking

Through informal discussions primarily with the man who ended up acting as the 'caretaker', it became clear that hard drugs, dictated much of the building's social fabric, demographic make-up, and most importantly, management. It was slowly revealed to us that many of the rooms were rented by drug dealers from the 'original' tenants, and many were, in turn, given to managers who sold the drugs from the room on a daily basis and set down the room rules, etc. Those users that bought their drugs from a room were able to stay there as long as they continued to buy their drugs from that specific dealer. As many as 20 people could sleep head-to-toe in one room of about twelve square metres, with different people every night.

These aspects resulted in a number of behaviours and intricate power and management dynamics that are very hard to break. With the number of people per room in these setups being so high, the number of drug users was on par, if not higher, than those not substance-dependent. Trying to change behaviours such as urinating and defecating in the corridor outside their rooms at night, or throwing any waste directly outside their windows was virtually impossible. Furthermore, if their primary purpose for being in the building is drugs, and they hold a very temporary existence, there is absolutely no incentive to improve their living environment or even attend meetings to discuss these possibilities.

What we realised is that many of the people that attended our 'rooftop' meetings were the drug dealers and their managers. Furthermore, what came out right at the end of Planact's involvement was that three of the men elected onto the committee were dealers. They were invested in making Milton Court work, partly to ensure that customers kept coming, and also in the hope that the City and Metro Police did not bother them in running their business as much. In fact, while we were told that they were collecting contributions from residents, very few were actually contributing, and it was these three that had almost solely funded the men who did the initial clean-up, as well as the plumbing, security gate and on-

going full-time cleaner. It was for this reason that they were most popular amongst residents. Eventually we discovered that although elected onto the 'residents committee', they actually lived in other, much better buildings nearby!

An additional concern was the gender dynamics at play within the building, which possibly tied into the same problematic power dynamics. Although roughly one third of voters at the election were women, they had chosen to nominate and vote only for men. After discussions with more gender-sensitive colleagues after the election, it became clear that at least a few women should have decision-making power, as basic issues such as sanitation and safety affected women very differently. During the first management training workshop, the new committee responded well to this suggestion, and decided that they would speak to different women they thought would be good leaders, and Planact would facilitate an election process. However, it soon became clear that no women wished to take up this role.

### Limitations for effective project scoping and results thereof

Planact asked residents during the first 'committee meetings' to indicate the most problematic things about their direct environment, and then confirmed this at a mass meeting. They indicated that the build-up of waste was worst, then the lack of access to water, lack of toilets, lack of electricity, police corruption, overcrowding, as well as security problems which led to further harassment by police. However, what residents did not reveal in any way were the problems of subletting and drug trafficking, which were intricately linked, as well as drug and alcohol addiction, xenophobic tensions, a constantly shifting population, and the sheer scale of the dependency on other illegal activities such as prostitution and the unlicensed manufacturing and sale of alcohol. It was these aspects that would result in Planact's work being very difficult, and if we knew about them, would have probably resulted in the decision not to proceed.

It would be easy to simply say that more research should have been carried out at the start of the project as part of the feasibility study (see PMI, 2000). However, there were a number of reasons why comprehensive research was not possible, and even if carried out, may not have revealed anything. Firstly, residents in these 'bad' buildings are extremely suspicious of any outsiders.<sup>12</sup> Without first developing a 'track record' with residents by showing them that we are supporting them, and not prying too much with the possible intention of reporting their immigration status or otherwise, we would probably have suffered the same fate.

Secondly, also to prevent any mistrust forming, at the start of our work we always visited the building accompanied by an ICRC representative. Like residents, they wished for the project to go ahead, and it was not in their interest to reveal the true situation. It was also probable that the ICRC did not know the finer details, as they had not done any focused research in the building. Thirdly, even if we had been able to do comprehensive research, it would have been unlikely that individual residents would have talked to us, for fear of the internal management structures in the building, as well as the various organs of State. Lastly, we were faced with concealment and plain dishonesty during the feasibility and scoping meetings with the 'committee', which was very misleading: our questions were answered

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<sup>12</sup> The Wits researcher we brought on board, for example, received death threats from another building (Dark City), because he was confused with a journalist who had accompanied the owner on a tour. MSF had been previously driven from Milton Court before we started the joint partnership there, because they were suspected of colluding with the City of Joburg.

seemingly without reserve, and at the start, we had little reason to think that we should assess the validity with input from other residents.

This lack of knowledge and false impressions can have dire consequences, particularly to do with strengthening the power dynamics in corrupt management practices. By providing the tools and motivating amongst residents that a clean-up campaign would be worthwhile, then holding an election, we allowed a few of the more active drug traders to gain power by showing financial support and then being elected into a formal management structure. These perverse consequences have been seen also in other buildings, for example where MSF supported a similar clean-up at Dikwela, an occupied warehouse in Doornfontien. By clearing out the waste on the ground floor/ basement, people that had gained power at the time were able to take control of the space and sell off sections. This floor had no windows or ventilation, had black mould and was flooded in sections in summer, and thus the campaign resulted in people being exposed to conditions far worse than anything in the building before the clean-up.

In Milton Court, it could be said that at a surface level we *did* succeed in our 'quick win' goals: mostly through working closely with one very driven resident, the 'caretaker', through whatever means, the masses of waste were cleaned, and drains underneath unblocked, so that at least those living on the ground floor did not have acrid water flowing through their homes, and waste pushing in through their broken windows. However, even without the intervention by the owner to evict residents, the longer-term sustainability is not guaranteed, and the implications on social relations and management as a result of our project are relatively unknown. Planact has brought a Wits researcher on board, and as part of his research he will be investigating the impact of our organisation and our partners' involvements in the building.



**Figure 6:** At a surface level we did succeed in our 'quick win' goals. Here, the Planact project officer demonstrates the line up to where the waste used to lie adjacent to the building.

### General approach to 'bad buildings' as bad as Milton Court

The participatory incremental upgrading approach applied in the Milton Court project would seem to remain the only real option in buildings like these. However, work in high density/high rise buildings is very different to that in informal settlements: the close proximity and operational functionality of buildings as a single 'unit' mean that individuals' behaviour has a much greater impact on those surrounding them. The provision of accommodation, and management, was intricately tied into the building as a structure, and the dangers of perverse outcomes as a result of interventions is high. Despite the effort of a select few within the building, it seemed there was little hope for a successful and sustainable

turnaround. Planact became more and more convinced during their work that the strategy in the best interest of residents would actually be to clear the building, relocating all residents that qualify to alternative accommodation, as per the City's Bad Buildings Strategy.<sup>13</sup> This would seem to be the only way to break the problematic relationships and general behaviour. Furthermore, the future of these buildings is too unstable, with residents facing eviction at any time.

However, if the relocation of residents to alternative accommodation were to occur, then who qualifies? For instance, a street trader sending three brothers through school with the money he is able to save on accommodation, but who is also an undocumented migrant, would likely be have his entire family's livelihood disrupted. Nowhere on the 'official' spectrum in Johannesburg are you able to find accommodation for under R350/ month, except in very few subsidised emergency accommodation projects (i.e. hostel beds available on a night-by-night basis). The City is now required to provide alternative accommodation to occupants that have been evicted through a court order (Courtenay & Mosikili, 2011). However, the City's capacity in this regard is very limited, and in any case, this accommodation is supposed to be only temporary.

### Conclusion and Way Forward Regarding Planact's work in the inner city

Bad buildings' pose several problems for the management of housing stock in Johannesburg, at a city and a building level. However, they also provide accommodation in high demand to very low-income residents needing to access Johannesburg's inner city. The Milton Court pilot project was based on a participatory incremental upgrading approach, as applied in informal settlements by Planact and international organisations. Over the course of five months, project participants made significant gains, including removing the bulk of the waste, and assisting to upgrade some of the facilities. A management structure was put in place and capacity building begun. On the surface, the project would seem to be a success. However, this was made possible through the motivation of only two residents. The behaviour of the majority remains unchanged, and the intricate links with drug trafficking discovered over the course of our work are highly likely to remain. Longer-term sustainability of the efforts is not likely, and the results of our project on the problematic management structures could be quite worrying. Although controversial, it would seem that the only realistic way of bettering the living conditions of residents in buildings as bad as these would be to relocate them.

Within its 'research and advocacy' stream, Planact could investigate different options currently available to low-income residents, with a focus on the *informal* market, and how they are managed both at a city and building level. Piecing together different practical examples of what is available, the organisation could explore a different approach within the City Council and beyond. Instead of attempting to be the direct suppliers of accommodation for low-income households, or relying wholly on the formal housing market, the City could support those initiatives existing in the informal sphere, by assisting in the mitigation of the more problematic health and safety infringements, but recognising that the informal market is essential to accommodating the poor in better-located areas.

A further role for Planact, and part of this process, would be to draw different stakeholders together, starting with NGOs and CBOs, firstly to introduce each other the work we are

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<sup>13</sup> Although, as mentioned above, the 'Bad Buildings strategy doesn't provide suggestions with this specific type of management structure in place (Zack et al, 2009).

doing in the inner city, and furthermore to discuss possible strategies for dealing with bad buildings and general management crises in Johannesburg's inner city housing stock. Wits' Centre for Built Environment Studies is currently assessing research possibilities for Johannesburg's inner city, and Planact would be well placed to guide research in a worthwhile direction.

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